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NOTES
LIGHTS,  CAMERA,  LEGAL  ACTION:  ASSESSING
THE  QUESTION  OF  ACTING  PERFORMANCE




In a controversial opinion released in May 2015, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed an unusual, and highly publi-
cized, copyright question: Can an actor claim a copyright in his or her indi-
vidual dramatic performance, distinct from the film at large?1  In Garcia v.
Google, Inc., the court initially held that an actor, like the plaintiff, Garcia,
could possibly claim a copyright interest for her individual performance in a
film, so long as that contribution met the threshold requirements of
copyrightability laid out in the Copyright Act.2  After an uproar from third-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2017.
1 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
2 Garcia v. Google, Inc. (Garcia Amended Opinion), 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d
en banc, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015).  When referencing the initial Garcia decision, I cite
to the Amended Opinion of the Ninth Circuit, as the substantive legal analysis is consistent
with its initial opinion.  The change was only in the relief granted.  Additionally, it is worth
noting that the case reached the court as an appeal of a denial of a preliminary injunction.
Id. at 932–33.  As such, the court was not squarely answering the question of whether or
not Garcia had a copyright in her performance, but only whether she had shown a likeli-
hood of success on the merits. See id. at 935 (“We need not and do not decide whether
every actor has a copyright in his performance within a movie.  It suffices for now to hold
that, while the matter is fairly debatable, Garcia is likely to prevail based on the record and
arguments before us.”).  Perhaps due to the limited nature of its review—or perhaps fear-
ful of the implications of stating its holding more broadly—the court is careful with its
terminology in this opinion.  Judge Kozinski, writing for the majority, repeatedly refers to
Garcia’s performance as a “creative contribution to a work” rather than a work itself, see id.
at 934, and does not outright state that Garcia has a copyright, only that “she’s shown that
she is likely to succeed on her copyright claim.” Id. at 940.  Thus, even if the case had not
been reheard en banc, the availability of copyrights for acting performances would have
still been up for debate.
1641
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-4\NDL412.txt unknown Seq: 2 10-MAY-16 16:53
1642 notre dame law review [vol. 91:4
party content distributors, film industry players, and a variety of others, the
court revisited the case en banc.3  In an amended opinion, the court did a
full one-eighty, holding instead that Ms. Garcia had no copyright claim in her
performance and suggesting that actors may never obtain a copyright of this
sort.4
The Garcia litigation has ignited extensive debate in both professional
and academic communities regarding the possibility of granting copyrights
in actors’ individual performances.5  On one side, commentators argue that
recognizing such rights will lead to a “splintering” problem in the film indus-
try, as anyone who contributes something minimally creative to a film could
claim a copyright interest, leading to a title searching problem for down-
stream users,6 imposing practical burdens on producers of creative works,7
and violating the Constitutional mandate that copyright law “promote . . .
[p]rogress.”8  On the other side, however, parties assert that these fears are
exaggerated, and so long as an acting performance meets the minimal
requirements for copyrightability set forth in the Copyright Act,9 it should
receive protection.10  The fact that the Ninth Circuit, arguably most
equipped to evaluate claims relating to motion pictures,11 came out on each
3 See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
4 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 740.
5 See, e.g., Paul M. Azzi, Note, Two Wrongs Don’t Make a Copyright: The Dangerous Implica-
tion of Granting a Copyright in Performance Per Se, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 529, 530, 556 (2014)
(rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s initial Garcia decision for its potential detrimental effects on
the entertainment industry and application of copyright law to film); see also generally Jacob
M. Victor, Garcia v. Google and a “Related Rights” Alternative to Copyright in Acting Perform-
ances, 124 YALE L.J.F. 80 (2014) (identifying the holes in American intellectual property law
revealed during the Garcia litigation and suggesting the adoption of a European-style
related rights regime).
6 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 742; see, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Garcia v. Google Reversed; Many
Sigh in Relief, REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG (May 19, 2015, 11:18 AM), http://tushnet.blog
spot.co.uk/2015/05/garcia-v-google-reversed-many-sigh-in.html (suggesting that the “risk
of making every five seconds [of film] into its own work” outweighs the arguments for
giving Garcia a copyright in her performance).
7 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Intellectual Property Law in Support of
Google, Inc. and YouTube, LLC’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 1, Garcia v. Google
Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-57302) (“Amici anticipate that this Court’s deci-
sion, unless corrected, will create significant practical difficulties for firms and individuals
producing the creative works that copyright is intended to incentivize.”).
8 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
9 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (setting out requirements of originality, fixation, and
authorship for copyright protection).
10 See, e.g., Marc Sketchler, Note, I Didn’t Say That: The Ninth Circuit’s Novel and Impor-
tant Extension of Copyright Protection in Garcia v. Google, Inc., 17 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 353, 360–63 (2014) (supporting the recognition of Garcia’s copyright because she
met copyright minimums).
11 The Ninth Circuit has been coined the “Hollywood Circuit” due to the prominence
of issues pertaining to the entertainment industry in its caseload. See, e.g., White v. Sam-
sung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (refer-
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side of this argument at some point during the Garcia litigation12 illustrates
the complicated nature of this question.
In its en banc opinion, the court noted that Garcia’s claim was inconceiv-
able under American copyright law, but intimated that she might have had a
viable claim had her case arisen in a foreign jurisdiction.13  According to the
court, Garcia’s claim was more attuned to a system that recognizes either
moral rights14 or a right to be forgotten,15 which would better enable Garcia
to “have her connection to the film forgotten and stripped from YouTube.”16
American copyright law has historically rejected any notion that authors are
ring to the Circuit as the “Hollywood Circuit” in a right of publicity case concerning a
celebrity).
12 In its initial opinion, the Ninth Circuit found that Garcia likely satisfied the mini-
mum requirements for copyright protection, and as such, may have a copyright interest in
her performance, rejecting the argument that recognition of such an interest would create
complications in the film industry. Garcia Amended Opinion, 766 F.3d 929, 935, 940 (9th
Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015).  In its subsequent en banc opinion,
the court instead found that Garcia did not meet the Copyright Act’s minimum require-
ments, and placed significant weight on the potential effects of recognizing such rights in
the film industry. Garcia, 786 F.3d at 742–43.
13 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 745–46.
14 Id. at 746.  The court states, “Nor is Garcia protected by the benefits found in many
European countries, where authors have ‘moral rights’ to control the integrity of their
works and to guard against distortion, manipulation, or misappropriation.” Id. (citing Kel-
ley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 296 (7th Cir. 2011)).  Moral rights, which are especially
prominent in European countries, serve to protect the author’s personhood and the integ-
rity of his or her works beyond the proprietary interests. See, e.g., Robert C. Bird & Lucille
M. Ponte, Protecting Moral Rights in the United States and the United Kingdom: Challenges and
Opportunities Under the U.K.’s New Performances Regulations, 24 B.U. INT’L L.J. 213, 217 (2006)
(explaining that “[t]he moral rights doctrine is premised on the idea that creators of artis-
tic works have certain personal rights that transcend the mere protection of economic or
property rights” in contrast to the traditional monist approach to intellectual property
rights taken in common law countries (citing Gregory M. Duhl, Old Lyrics, Knock-Off Videos,
and Copycat Comic Books: The Fourth Fair Use Factor in U.S. Copyright Law, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV.
665, 705–06 (2004)); Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532,
1541–42; Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
795, 800–01 (2001); Calvin D. Peeler, From the Providence of Kings to Copyrighted Things (and
French Moral Rights), 9 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 423, 448 (1999); Jonathan Stuart Pink,
Moral Rights: A Copyright Conflict Between the United States and Canada, 1 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM.
171, 192–93 (1994); Monica E. Antezana, Note, The European Union Internet Copyright Direc-
tive as Even More than It Envisions: Toward a Supra-EU Harmonization of Copyright Policy and
Theory, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 415, 421–22 (2003); Robert J. Sherman, Note, The
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: American Artists Burned Again, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 379,
388–89 (1995))).  However, this would still require the existence of a copyrightable work,
which neither this opinion nor the court’s earlier opinion characterize an actor’s contribu-
tion to be.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
15 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 745.
16 Id.
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entitled to prevent the use of their works as a matter of natural right17—as
asserted under moral rights and the right to be forgotten18—instead justify-
ing copyright law as a tool for regulating economic efficiency so as to gener-
ate public benefits.19  As the court explained, moral rights are only
recognized in America in an extremely limited category of visual arts,20 from
which motion pictures are explicitly excluded.21  According to the court,
American copyright law was not the proper source of Garcia’s relief.22
Despite the United States’ apparent aversion to moral rights, the court’s
allusion to foreign policies in its opinion invites a deeper look into foreign
copyright policy to craft a potential solution for the problem of individual
performance copyrights.  Rather than analyzing the arguments in the Ninth
Circuit’s en banc opinion, this Note will explore the issues raised by Garcia in
light of international intellectual property law.  As mentioned, the Ninth Cir-
cuit made clear that an actor does not have a distinct copyright interest in his
or her individual performance within a film under current American copy-
right law.23  This Note will use comparative methods to consider whether an
actor should have such an interest based on America’s international obliga-
tions under various intellectual property treaties, the treatment of acting per-
formances in parallel foreign jurisdictions, and the current framework of
American copyright law.  Despite agreeing that, on the particular facts of Gar-
cia, the Ninth Circuit reached the correct conclusion, this Note asserts that
Garcia has identified a gap in American intellectual property law.  In accor-
dance with the fundamental principles underlying intellectual property law
and global trends, this Note will argue that this problem should be addressed
by incorporating into the American intellectual property scheme an enumer-
ated set of performers’ rights and limited moral rights.
17 See, e.g., Bird & Ponte, supra note 14, at 247 (explaining that under the American
approach to copyright, rights are not inherent or natural to the author but come from
statute).
18 For example, moral rights commonly recognize a “right of integrity,” which enables
an author to object to certain modifications and prejudicial uses of his works as a matter of
right. See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Moral Rights: Diagnosis and Rehabilitation, 46 AM. BUS. L.J.
407, 410–11 (2009) (“The right of integrity permits the creator to halt significant modifica-
tion of the work and to prohibit presentation of a work in a derogatory manner contrary to
the intentions of the creator.” (citing Lee, supra note 14, at 802)).
19 See, e.g., id. (“The U.S. observes a utilitarian approach to creative works, seeking to
promote the public good through granting economic incentives for creative endeavors.”
(citing Antezana, supra note 14, at 424, 432–33; Brandi L. Holland, Note, Moral Rights
Protection in the United States and the Effect of the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005
on U.S. International Obligations, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 217, 230 (2006); Sherman, supra
note 14, at 389–90)).
20 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 746; see Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A
(2012).
21 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A work of visual art does not include . . . any . . . motion
picture . . . .”).
22 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
23 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 741.
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Part I of this Note will provide the background of the Garcia case, outlin-
ing the relevant portions of the Ninth Circuit’s initial opinion, as well as its
subsequent en banc opinion.  In particular, it will confront the court’s asser-
tion that the interest claimed by Garcia may be more readily recognized in
certain foreign jurisdictions.24
Continuing from this proposition, Part II will address the availability of
copyright protection for acting performances in audiovisual works abroad.
For this comparison, this Note will first look at French copyright law, widely
accepted as the most author-friendly of Western intellectual property
regimes,25 acknowledging the natural law philosophies that form the bed-
rock of this law.26  Next, this Part will turn to copyright law in the United
Kingdom—considered a middle ground between continental European and
American regimes27—to investigate its treatment of performance copyrights,
paying special attention to the limited, yet critical, role moral rights play in
this system.28  Ultimately, this Note will assert that such a limited recognition
of intellectual property rights for performers and partial moral rights regime
could reasonably be incorporated into American law to provide actors with
legal support.  Finally, this Part will turn to the United States’ obligations
under international law to assert that American law should be amended so as
to recognize the possibility of actors obtaining copyrights in their individual
performances within audiovisual works.  Despite foundational differences in
intellectual property philosophy between the United States and European
countries, outlined in Part II, the United States’ obligations under the Beij-
ing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances (“the Beijing Treaty”) and Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“the Berne
Convention” or “Berne”) require that domestic intellectual property laws rec-
ognize rights of this sort.  This Part will reference the U.K.’s efforts to comply
with these same treaties as evidence that acting performance copyrights and
moral rights are not discordant with the traditional common law view of cop-
yright as an economic tool to encourage public dissemination of creative
works.29
Part III of this Note will frame the issue of acting performance copy-
rights in light of the 1976 Copyright Act, which currently governs copyright
24 See supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text.
25 See, e.g., Bird & Ponte, supra note 14, at 227 (“French law provides the broadest
moral rights protection . . . .” (citing Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right:
Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12 (1985); Lee, supra note 14, at 803)).
26 See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L.
REV. 1, 6–12 (1997) (providing the philosophical background of the French copyright in
the philosophies of Kant and Hegel and the theory that one’s creative works are an exten-
sion of one’s person).
27 Bird & Ponte, supra note 14, at 227 (stating that the U.K.’s moral rights protection
falls between the broad approach of French and narrow approach of the United States).
28 See, e.g., id. at 240, 246 (explaining the functional limitations on moral rights
imposed by U.K. copyright law).
29 Id. at 266 (“[T]he U.K.’s regulations erode U.S. claims that the recognition of
moral rights is incompatible with common law traditions . . . .”).
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law in the United States.  After summarizing the minimum requirements for
copyright protection, this Part will elaborate on three types of works contem-
plated by the Act as valid recipients of copyright protection: choreographic
works, pantomimes, and sound recordings.  Comparing an actor’s perform-
ance to these legitimate performance-related rights, this Part will assess the
ability of American copyright law to absorb acting performances into its
existing structure.  It will also describe the various limiting doctrines of copy-
right law to suggest that significant safeguards already exist to prevent acting
performance copyrights from turning the entertainment industry on its
head.
Ultimately, this Note will conclude that by slightly modifying its current
laws in a manner similar to the U.K., America could provide protection to
actors like Garcia, bringing its laws into better harmony with Europe to the
benefit of authors and the public at large.
I. GARCIA V. GOOGLE
Cindy Lee Garcia’s troubles began when she answered a casting call for
an action-adventure film called Desert Warrior and was selected for a cameo
role.30  Her character only appeared in a few pages of the entire script, and
she had two speaking lines.31  Garcia was present for three-and-a-half days of
filming, which were overseen by the film’s writer and director, Mark Basseley
Youssef.32  In performing her lines, Garcia was instructed to “seem[ ] con-
cerned.”33  She was paid a total sum of $500 for her involvement in the
film.34
Nearly a year after the initial casting call, Youssef completed a film using
Garcia’s performance.35  However, the film was nothing like the action-
adventure film for which Garcia believed she was acting.36  Instead, Youssef
incorporated Garcia’s performance into an anti-Islamic propaganda film
entitled Innocence of Muslims, which portrayed the Prophet Mohammed as “a
murderer, pedophile, and homosexual.”37  Garcia’s speaking performance
was dubbed over, so that her character instead was attributed with the line,
“Is your Mohammed a child molester?”38  Garcia did not consent to her per-
formance being used in this manner—or in any manner beyond the action-
30 Garcia Amended Opinion, 766 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d
733, 737 (9th Cir. 2015).
31 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).  Garcia’s speak-
ing role was as follows: “Is George crazy?  Our daughter is but a child?” Id.
32 Garcia Amended Opinion, 766 F.3d 929 at 932.
33 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 737 (alteration in original).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 736 (stating that Garcia was “bamboozled” by the film in which her perform-
ance was incorporated).
37 Id. at 737.
38 Id.
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adventure film—and was unaware of Youssef’s ulterior film plans until she
saw the trailer on YouTube.39
The YouTube trailer of Innocence of Muslims sparked outrage and was
linked to “numerous violent protests” across the Middle East.40  Garcia
received several death threats41 and promptly contacted Google, Inc., the
owner of YouTube, asserting that the film was hate speech and violated her
privacy and publicity rights under California law.42  She also sent Google five
takedown notices pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, “claim-
ing that YouTube’s broadcast of Innocence of Muslims infringed her copyright
in her ‘audio-visual dramatic performance.’”43
When Garcia’s case reached the district court, she had refined her
claims to include allegations of copyright infringement.44  It is crucial to note
that Garcia did not claim, and was never granted, a copyright in the film as a
whole.45  She did not claim joint authorship—which would grant her rights
39 Id. at 737–38.
40 Id. at 738.  United States Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice linked the
dissemination of Innocence of Muslims with the September 11, 2012, attack on the U.S.
Embassy in Benghazi, Libya. Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Sept. 16, 2012),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/49051097/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts/t/september-ben-
jamin-netanyahu-susan-rice-keith-ellison-peter-king-bob-woodward-jeffrey-goldberg-andrea-
mitchell/#.VlSGwoR8vww (statement of United States Ambassador to the United Nations
Susan Rice).  Shortly thereafter, “an Egyptian cleric issued a fatwa against anyone associ-
ated with Innocence of Muslims, calling upon the ‘Muslim Youth in America[ ] and Europe’
to ‘kill the director, the producer[,] and the actors and everyone who helped and pro-
moted this film.’” Garcia, 786 F.3d at 738 (alteration in original); see also Makoa Kawabata,
Building Character: How to Grant Actors Limited Copyright Protection for Performances Without
Creating a New Species of Copyrighted Work, 16 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 1–2 (2014)
(recounting the political controversy sparked by Innocence of Muslims).
41 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 738.
42 Id.  Garcia initially filed her complaint against Google, Youssef, and other produc-
tion assistants in state court, alleging a multitude of wrongs including invasion of privacy,
false light, violation of her right of publicity, fraud, unfair business practices, slander, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.  However, Garcia voluntarily dismissed this
state lawsuit, instead filing suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California alleging copyright infringement against Google. Id.  Though she revived several
of her state law claims against Youssef in her initial district court complaint, those claims
were eventually dismissed.  Order Dismissing Action, Garcia v. Nakoula, No. CV-12-8315-
MWF(VBKx) (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2015) (order dismissing action with prejudice following
the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision and based on the parties’ stipulation).  Although,
based on the available facts, some of these claims might have had merit, this Note asserts
that Garcia’s problems are intellectual property problems at heart, and as such, should be
addressed within the bounds of intellectual property law.  Garcia was concerned with the
unauthorized usage of her creative work product, a concern properly categorized in copy-
right.  Plaintiffs like Garcia should not have to weave a patchwork of various tort claims to
obtain relief for copyright-based problems, especially when those problems are expressly
categorized as and handled within intellectual property law in many foreign jurisdictions.
This will be further addressed in Part II below.
43 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 738.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 741.
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to the film as a whole46—and did not claim any interest in the underlying
screenplay.47  Instead, Garcia claimed that she had an independent copy-
right in her individual acting performance, distinct from the copyrights in
the film and screenplay.48  Still, the district court denied Garcia’s request for
a preliminary injunction, finding that she had not established a likelihood of
success on the merits, particularly in light of the murky nature of her copy-
right claim.49  The district court concluded that even if Garcia did have a
copyright interest in her individual performance within the film, she had
clearly granted Youssef “an implied license to ‘distribute her performance as
a contribution incorporated into the indivisible whole of the Film.’”50
Garcia appealed to the Ninth Circuit who reversed the lower court.51
Judge Kozinski, writing the majority opinion, held that Garcia did in fact
show a likelihood of success in claiming a copyright interest in her individual
performance in the film.52  According to the opinion, Garcia had obtained
this right because her performance met the Copyright Act’s copyrightability
threshold, which requires an original work of authorship fixed in a tangible
medium of expression.53  According to Judge Kozinski, “An actor’s perform-
ance, when fixed, is copyrightable if it evinces ‘some minimal degree of crea-
tivity . . . “no matter how crude, humble or obvious” it might be.’”54
In this opinion, the Ninth Circuit framed Garcia’s performance as a
derivative work,55 and as such, explained that Garcia only had a copyright
interest in those elements of the performance that she authored.56  She had
no claim to her textual lines of script or the direction she received from
Youssef.57  Google argued that Garcia could not claim a copyright in her per-
46 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012) (“The authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright
in the work.”).
47 Garcia Amended Opinion, 766 F.3d 929, 935 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d
733 (9th Cir. 2015).
48 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 737.
49 Id. at 738 (“[T]he district court found that the nature of Garcia’s copyright interest
was unclear . . . .”).
50 Id.
51 Garcia Amended Opinion, 766 F.3d at 940.
52 Id. at 935.
53 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
54 Garcia Amended Opinion, 766 F.3d at 934 (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)).
55 Id. at 935 (explaining that an actor’s performance is derivative of the motion pic-
ture and screenplay, which are independently copyrightable); see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A
‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation,
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”).
56 Id; see 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (“The copyright in a compilation or derivative work
extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from
the preexisting material employed in the work . . . .”).
57 Garcia Amended Opinion, 766 F.3d at 935 (“She can claim copyright in her own con-
tribution but not in ‘preexisting material’ such as the words or actions spelled out in the
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formance because she did not author the script, received staging directions,
and had no control over the production of the scene or its incorporation
into the final work.58  The court rejected this, though, pointing out that
actors are not merely puppets.  Judge Kozinski wrote:
[A]n actor does far more than speak words on a page; he must “live his part
inwardly, and then . . . give to his experience an external embodiment.”
That embodiment includes body language, facial expression and reactions
to other actors and elements of a scene.  Otherwise, “every shmuck . . . is an
actor because everyone . . . knows how to read.”59
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the district court’s conclusion that Gar-
cia granted Youssef an implied license to use her performance in Innocence of
Muslims.60  The court pointed out that all licenses have limits.61  Even if Gar-
cia granted Youssef a license to use her performance in the action-adventure
film for which she was cast, “[Innocence of Muslims] differs so radically from
anything Garcia could have imagined when she was cast that it can’t possibly
be authorized by any implied license she granted Youssef.”62
After backlash from a multitude of industries and interest groups,63 the
Ninth Circuit decided to rehear Garcia’s case en banc, and ultimately
reversed its initial opinion.64  Writing for the majority, Judge McKeown
rejected Garcia’s copyright claim, highlighting her minimal role in the film
en route to his conclusion that actors, especially Garcia, do not have individ-
ual copyright interests in their performances embedded in larger films.65  In
contrast to Judge Kozinski’s acknowledgment of actors’ creative contribu-
tions,66 which he revived in a dissent to the en banc opinion,67 Judge McKe-
own discounted Garcia’s “five-second acting performance”68 and swiftly
underlying script.” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 103(b)) (citing U.S. Auto Parts Network, Inc. v.
Parts Geek, LLC, 692 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2012))).
58 Id. at 934.
59 Id. (internal citations omitted).
60 Id. at 937.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 After the court published its initial opinion, Google and YouTube petitioned for en
banc rehearing on the copyright issues, and were supported by a mass of amicus briefs
from parties such as news organizations, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Netflix,
Adobe, Facebook, and Professors of Intellectual Property, among others.  Garcia v. Google,
Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 735–36 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
64 Id. at 747.
65 Id. at 740–41.
66 See Garcia Amended Opinion, 766 F.3d at 934; see also supra notes 53–59 and accompa-
nying text.
67 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 749 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 736 (majority opinion); see also id. at 741, 747 (referring to Garcia’s contribu-
tion as a “five-second performance”).  This emphasis on the brief nature of Garcia’s contri-
bution could raise Bleistein concerns. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188
U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (establishing that it is not the role of the courts to evaluate the artistic
merit or value of works in analyzing copyright issues).
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dismissed the suggestion of copyright in individual acting performances.69
The court’s main concern was the “splintering” effect70 that recognizing such
a right might have—enabling any and every individual who contributes to a
film to obtain a copyright.71
Additionally, the court relied heavily on the fact that Garcia had been
denied copyright registration for her acting performance by the United
States Copyright Office.72  In its response, the Copyright Office asserted that
its “longstanding practices do not allow a copyright claim by an individual
actor or actress in his or her performance contained within a motion pic-
ture.”73  It explained that actors’ performances were integrated into motion
pictures and could not be given distinct protection.74  Actors could only
obtain copyright as joint authors, and their performances would mostly be
governed by the work-made-for-hire doctrine.75  The Office’s ultimate con-
69 Id. at 740 (“The central question is whether the law and facts clearly favor Garcia’s
claim to a copyright in her five-second acting performance . . . . The answer is no.”).
70 Id. at 742.  For this proposition, the court relied heavily on the circuit’s seminal
joint authorship case, Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000).  In Aalmuham-
med, the plaintiff was hired by a big-budget production company as a historical and relig-
ious consultant for an upcoming film about Malcolm X. Id. at 1229.  After production was
completed, the plaintiff claimed joint authorship in the film. Id. at 1230.  The court
rejected his claim, noting the Copyright Act’s mandate that joint authorship only exists if
all contributing authors intend it to be so. Id. at 1234–35; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)
(defining “joint work”).  Further, the court noted the dangers of relaxing the joint author-
ship requirement in the context of film production: “So many people might qualify as an
‘author’ if the question were limited to whether they made a substantial creative contribu-
tion that that test would not distinguish one from another.” Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at
1233.  Though the Garcia court relied heavily on Aalmuhammed language, Aalmuhammed is
not analogous to Garcia’s claim. See Garcia, 786 F.3d at 750 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); Gar-
cia Amended Opinion, 766 F.3d at 934.  Unlike the plaintiff in Aalmuhammed, Garcia did not
seek rights to the film as a whole, only to her individual performance.  Judge Kozinski’s
dissent further points out the majority’s misuse of Aalmuhammed: “We went out of our way
to emphasize that joint authorship of a movie is a ‘different question’ from whether a
contribution to the movie can be a ‘work’ under section 102(a).  And we clearly stated that
a contribution to a movie can be copyrightable (and thus can be a ‘work’).” Garcia, 786
F.3d at 750 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1233, 1232 (inter-
nal citation omitted)).
71 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 743 (majority opinion).
72 Id. at 741–42.
73 Letter from Robert J. Kasunic, Assoc. Register of Copyrights and Dir. of Registration
Policy and Practices, U.S. Copyright Office, to M. Cris Armenta, The Armenta Law Firm 2
(Mar. 6, 2014) (on file with author) [hereinafter Copyright Office Letter].
74 Id.
75 Id.  A work made for hire is either “a work prepared by an employee within the
scope of his or her employment” or
a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective
work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work . . . if the parties
expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be
considered a work made for hire.
17 U.S.C. § 101.  Under the work-made-for-hire doctrine, the copyright in work of author-
ship vests in the author’s employer rather than the author himself.
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clusion was the same as the Ninth Circuit’s: “If her contribution was neither a
work made for hire nor the requisite authorship to warrant a claim in a joint
work, Ms. Garcia has no separable claim to copyrightable authorship in her
performance.”76
Though the court addressed a multitude of different avenues through
which a person involved with a complex film could obtain a copyright inter-
est—licensing, joint authorship, derivative work, and work made for hire—
the court ultimately concluded that none of these roads led to a copyright for
Garcia.77  Despite the gravity of harm facing Garcia,78 the Ninth Circuit
rejected her claim altogether.79  If Garcia were to get relief for her troubles,
intellectual property law would not be the provider.80
In its opinion, the court also noted the discrepancy between American
and European laws in confronting claims like Garcia’s.  It explained that Gar-
cia’s claim might have succeeded in Europe, where actors could seek redress
through the right to be forgotten81 or moral rights.82  The right to be forgot-
ten, recently recognized by the European Union, requires Google to evaluate
requests from individuals to have personal information removed from the
Google search engine.83  Moral rights, as explained in Part II of this Note,
allow authors to obtain redress for uses that disparage the integrity of their
works.84  The court dismissed this discrepancy between American and Euro-
pean law as “[u]nfortunate[ ] for Garcia.”85
It is important to note that claims for copyright in an actor’s individual
performance like Garcia’s are rarely litigated.86  This is not because of the
obviousness of a solution to the dilemma, but instead because most acting
performances are regulated by contracts, express licenses, and the work-
made-for-hire doctrine.87  However, as evident from the language of the Cop-
76 Copyright Office Letter, supra note 73, at 2.
77 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 741–44.
78 Id. at 744 (noting the seriousness of the threats made to Garcia).
79 See id. at 747.
80 Id. at 740–41.
81 Id. at 745.
82 Id. at 746.
83 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (May
13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&doc
id=152065.
84 See, e.g., Bird & Ponte, supra note 14, at 221 (explaining the functions of the com-
mon moral rights).
85 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 745.
86 See id. at 743 (describing the difficulties of litigating claims for copyright in an
actor’s individual performance).  This is also possibly attributable to a widespread assump-
tion that such claims were not available.
87 Id.; see also Bonnie Teller, Note, Toward Better Protection of Performers in the United
States: A Comparative Look at Performers’ Rights in the United States, Under the Rome Convention
and in France, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 775, 779 (1990) (“Due to the ‘work for hire’
doctrine . . . most performers in audiovisual works . . . are statutorily alienated from the
copyright in the work they create.” (citing 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988))).
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yright Act88 and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of such, no sophistica-
tion is required for one to obtain a copyright, in film or any other medium.89
Therefore, any “schmuck with a videocamera” can create a film that will be
protected by copyright.90  In such instances, implied licenses will generally
prevent the actors from suing for copyright infringement in their perform-
ances.91  But, thanks to modern technology and editing programs, the ease
with which performances can be spliced, altered, edited, and exploited
should raise concerns.92  It is not a stretch of the imagination to foresee
claims like Garcia’s arising in the future, where actors perform for one pur-
pose, only to discover that their performances have been recycled in a new
work.93  Though such individuals could potentially find redress from tort or
privacy laws, Garcia made clear that, at least in the Ninth Circuit, intellectual
property law will turn a blind eye.94
II. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR ACTING PERFORMANCES IN THE
INTERNATIONAL SPHERE
As the Ninth Circuit noted, had Garcia’s case arisen in a number of for-
eign jurisdictions, she would not have faced such difficulty establishing an
88 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (requiring only originality, authorship, and fixation
for copyright protection).
89 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (stating that
works don’t need to be artistically advanced for copyright protection, so long as they “pos-
sess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it might be” (quoting 1
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08[C][1] (1990)));
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) (explaining
that, unlike in patent, copyright does not require that a work is novel, highly unique, or
beyond the result of “ordinary skill” (quoting Henderson v. Tompkins, 60 F. 758, 764
(C.C.D. Mass. 1894))).
90 Garcia Amended Opinion, 766 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d
733 (9th Cir. 2015); see, e.g., Richard Masur, The Importance of Copyright Protection to Audio
and Audiovisual Performers in the Digital Age: An Actor’s Point of View of U.S. Copyright in the
Digital World, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 331, 333 (2015) (“High quality, affordable recording
hardware, coupled with low-cost editing through easily accessible computer apps has cre-
ated a nation of ‘filmmakers’ . . . [with the goal of] ‘exposure.’”).
91 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 743 (explaining that low-budget filmmakers are unlikely to use
express contracts or licenses in making their films, and in the absence of such explicit
agreements, the courts look for implied licenses).
92 Masur, supra note 90, at 332 (“Although some unauthorized copying was happening
in the era of analog videocassettes, an explosion of audiovisual theft was triggered by digi-
tal recording because of the perfect copies made possible by the technology.”).
93 Id. at 336 (explaining that constant advances in digital technology make it easy for
actors’ performances to be taken, reconfigured, and separately distributed as clips and
mash-ups, or “reedited in such a way so as to create comedic, prurient or other distortions
of the original intent of the filmmakers and the actors”).
94 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 744–45 (explaining that the relief Garcia seeks is inconsistent
with the purposes of copyright law and should instead be addressed through privacy or
publicity laws).
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intellectual property claim.95  In addition to offering broader intellectual
property rights in general, many foreign jurisdictions have specifically
decided to extend copyright protection to acting performances by joining
the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations of 1961 (“Rome Conven-
tion”).96  The Rome Convention has been ratified by ninety-two nations, the
United States not being one of them,97 and was formed in response to con-
cerns regarding new forms of technology that made reproduction of sounds
and performances far easier and cheaper than they had been in the past.98
Though the Rome Convention does not protect performances done for
audiovisual works, and thus does not confer rights upon film actors like Gar-
cia, it does protect a wide range of performers beyond the traditional scope
of copyright law.99  The Rome Convention gives these performers the right
to prevent, among other things, the unauthorized reproduction of a fixation
of a performance “if the reproduction is made for purposes different from
those for which the performers gave their consent.”100  While many consider
the Convention itself outdated and too modest in its provisions,101 it is rele-
vant to this Note as evidence that a significant number of countries have
explicitly recognized an individual interest in certain performances—distinct
from the larger works in which they appear—since as early as 1961.
The United States has not signed the Rome Convention, and as exhib-
ited by Garcia, has not implemented legislation to recognize copyrights for
actors’ performances.102  This position stands in contrast to copyright
regimes in many countries with which the United States frequently inter-
95 See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
96 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phono-
grams and Broadcasting Organisations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Rome
Convention].
97 WIPO-Administered Treaties: Contracting Parties, Rome Convention, WORLD INTELLEC-
TUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=17 (last vis-
ited Apr. 12, 2016).
98 See, e.g., Teller, supra note 87, at 775–76 (explaining that the Rome Convention was
intended to address problems with performers’ rights raised by technological develop-
ment); see also generally Masur, supra note 90 (describing the concerns faced by actors in
coping with digital technology).
99 Ted Shapiro, The Beijing Audiovisual Performers Treaty: A Long March to Compliance?,
25 ENT. L. REV. 291, 292–93 (2014) (performances fixed in audiovisual works are excluded
from protection under treaties governing performance rights such as the Rome Conven-
tion and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT)).
100 Rome Convention, supra note 96, art. 7(1)(c)(ii).
101 See, e.g., Deming Liu, The Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances and its Impact on
the Future of Performers’ Rights Under English Law, 37 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 81, 81 (2015);
Teller, supra note 87, at 789.
102 Shapiro, supra note 99, at 293 (explaining that the only recognition of performers’
rights in U.S. copyright law occurs in Section 1101 of the Copyright Act, but is limited to
the fixation of live musical performances and therefore does not affect actors); Victor,
supra note 5, at 80 (“[U]nder American law, acting performances must either be governed
by conventional copyright law or receive no IP protection at all.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-4\NDL412.txt unknown Seq: 14 10-MAY-16 16:53
1654 notre dame law review [vol. 91:4
acts.103  Though, until the recent Beijing Treaty,104 performances fixed in
audiovisual works have not received full international protection and many
nations have implemented legislation, often called “related” or “neighbor-
ing” rights schemes, to provide actors with copyright-based rights in their
performances.105  In light of the international nature of the film industry,106
the United States’ failure to entertain the adoption of even minimum copy-
right protection for performers places American actors at a significant eco-
nomic disadvantage.107  One commentator has explained that the United
States’ failure to follow the emerging international pattern of recognizing
certain intellectual property rights for actors increases transaction costs, as
film producers—who, in light of the massive casts used in many films, fre-
quently deal with actors from different nations—have to spend additional
time and resources learning actors’ expectations and negotiating for the
rights to exploit their works.108  As noted by the Garcia court,109 and as will
be explained in the following Sections, economic reward in exchange for
public dissemination has been traditionally cited as the foundational purpose
of copyright law in America.110  Under its current system, though, both film
103 See, e.g., Bird & Ponte, supra note 14, at 213 (“Tensions have traditionally existed
between civil and common law nations over the nature of the legal protections provided
for creative works.” (citing Sherman, supra note 14, at 379–80, 388–90)).
104 See infra Section II.C.
105 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 99, at 293 (noting that performers are not equated with
traditional authors at the international level, but instead are protected via a “related rights”
approach); Victor, supra note 5, at 85 n.34, 86 (noting that France, Germany, and the U.K.
all have implemented a related rights copyright system whereby actors receive a limited, yet
effective, set of economic and moral rights in their performances).
106 See, e.g., Owen Morgan, The Problem of the International Protection of Audiovisual Per-
formances, 33 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 810, 816 (2002) (“[A]udiovisual
works are increasingly produced and financed across national borders which makes consis-
tency and certainty of transfer and rights ownership rules extremely important.” (quoting
United States of America, Submission of the United States of America on Transfer, at 2, Standing
Comm. on Copyright and Related Rights, World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Fourth
Session, SCCR/4/4 (Apr. 6, 2000), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/
sccr_4/sccr_4_4.pdf)).
107 See, e.g., Masur, supra note 90, at 336–37 (asserting that the losses suffered by actors
“flow primarily from an evolution of technology and a failure of the copyright law to ade-
quately address these new . . . issues and protect those who may be harmed by the growing
amounts of infringement made possible by digital technology”); Teller, supra note 84, at
775 (arguing that the problem of unauthorized reproduction and distribution of acting
performances is “exacerbated because the United States has no uniform, national system
of protection for performers and has not signed” the Rome Convention).
108 Morgan, supra note 106, at 816 (explaining transaction costs of contracting in the
film industry).
109 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 744–45 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (explaining
that copyright law serves as an economic incentive for authors to create and disseminate
works).
110 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
(“By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”).
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producers and actors are economically disadvantaged by the murky nature of
actors’ rights, which could impede creative production.111  Thus, the United
States’ aversion to the actor-friendly approach of international copyright
regimes—explained more in the following Sections—should not deter it
from recognizing copyrights for actors, as such laws would indeed be consis-
tent with the economic incentive theory that fuels the development of its
domestic copyright law.  Below, this Note will briefly examine the laws in
place in France and the United Kingdom to reveal possible solutions to the
disadvantage currently suffered by American actors.
A. French Copyright Law
In France, copyright is called “droit d’auteur,” which translates to
“author’s right.”112  Copyright protection is set out in statute, the Code de la
propriété intellectuelle (“IP Code”).113  French copyright law is significantly
more author-friendly than American, or even other European, regimes,114 in
that it “allows authors to control the reproduction and performance of their
intellectual creations.”115  Unlike American law, which is built on utilitarian
principles,116 French copyright law is rooted in natural law and adheres to
the belief that copyright is a natural right, as an author’s creative works are
an extension of his personality.117  This notion of the moral right is central
to French copyright law.  Indeed, the definition of author in the IP Code
111 See Morgan, supra note 106, at 816.
112 Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Authors’ Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness and Morality of
French and American Law Compared, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 558 (2006).
113 CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C. PROP. INTELL.] [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CODE] art. L112-1 (Fr.), English translation available at https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
content/download/1959/13723/version/3/file/Code_35.pdf (“The provisions of this
Code shall protect the rights of authors in all works of the mind, whatever their kind, form
of expression, merit or purpose.”).
114 See, e.g., Piotraut, supra note 112, at 550 (explaining the “remarkably broad protec-
tion conferred to authors by French copyright law, particularly when compared to the
United States jurisprudence in the same area”).
115 Id. at 563.
116 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’” (quot-
ing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8)); Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976)
(“American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights or provide
a cause of action for their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather
than the personal, rights of authors.”); Shapiro, supra note 99, at 293 (stating that the lack
of moral rights recognition in America “stems from the ‘utilitarian’ nature of US copyright
law” (citing ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY xiii (2010))).
117 Piotraut, supra note 112, at 555 (explaining that in France “[c]opyright is deemed a
natural right, part of the natural law, a true extension of personality, consisting of eco-
nomic and moral rights, i.e., the right to forbid uses of a work which would discredit the
author directly or through his work” (quoting David Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm
in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 421, 425 (1983))).
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includes “attributes of an intellectual and moral nature as well as attributes of
an economic nature.”118  The inclusion of “economic nature” as distinct and
secondary in this clause demonstrates that moral rights are of primary impor-
tance in French intellectual property law.  This is further exemplified by the
fact that moral rights attach to individual authors, but not to corporations.119
These elements combine to establish the “generally undisputed” notion that
“France has offered the most advanced protection of moral rights.”120
French moral rights include “the rights of disclosure, retraction, attribu-
tion, integrity, and resale royalties, as well as protections against misattribu-
tion, excessive criticism, and attacks on the creator’s personality.”121  These
rights are available to a broad spectrum of different types of works,122 rather
than just a privileged few as they are in the United States.123  Further, moral
rights under the IP Code are generally inalienable.124  This means that
regardless of who possesses the copyright in a work—if it was licensed or
assigned to someone other than the author—the author retains his moral
rights.125
Yet even setting aside this broad availability of moral rights to French
authors, performers are granted specific intellectual property rights that
their American counterparts lack.  France is one of the ninety-two nations
that signed the Rome Convention, and it enacted legislation to specifically
address actors’ rights in 1985.126  This law was incorporated into Article 212-3
of the IP Code, which states, “The performer’s written authorization shall be
required for fixation of his performance, its reproduction and communica-
tion to the public as also for any separate use of the sounds or images of his
118 C. PROP. INTELL. art. L111-1 (Fr.).
119 Id. art. L121-1 (“An author shall enjoy the right to respect for his name, his author-
ship and his work.  This right shall attach to his person.” (emphasis added)).
120 Bird & Ponte, supra note 14, at 227.
121 Id. (citing Kwall, supra note 25, at 12).
122 C. PROP. INTELL. art. L112-1 (Fr) (“The provisions of this Code shall protect the
rights of authors in all works of the mind, whatever their kind, form of expression, merit or
purpose.”).
123 See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 603(a), 104 Stat. 5089,
5128 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) (2012)) (moral rights only recognized in visual arts).
124 C. PROP. INTELL. art. L121-1 (Fr) (“An author shall enjoy the right to respect for his
name, his authorship and his work. . . . It shall be perpetual, inalienable and imprescripti-
ble.”). But see Bird & Ponte, supra note 14, at 229 (noting that some courts have permitted
“limited waivers in contracts if the courts view those waivers as reasonable and not substan-
tive alterations or distortions of the creative work” (citing Thomas P. Heide, The Moral
Right of Integrity and the Global Information Infrastructure: Time for a New Approach?, 2 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 211, 214 (1996); Kwall, supra note 25, at 12–13)).
125 Bird & Ponte, supra note 14, at 230.
126 Loi 1985-660 du 3 juillet 1985 relative aux droits d’auteur et aux droits des artistes-
interprètes, des producteurs de phonogrammes et de vidéogrammes et des entreprises de
communication audiovisuelle [Law No. 85-660 of July 3, 1985 on Author’s Rights and on
the Rights of Performers, Producers of Phonogram and Videogram and Audiovisual Com-
munication Enterprises], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 4, 1985, p. 7495.
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performance where both the sounds and images have been fixed.”127  It also
imposes a compulsory licensing scheme for exploitation of actors’ perform-
ances, setting a minimum industry standard for remunerations and providing
a guideline for parties contracting on their own.128  As a result, performers
have redress for unauthorized reproductions of their performances even
when their moral rights are not infringed.  France has also signed the Beijing
Treaty, discussed below, which addresses performers whose works are fixed in
audiovisual works.129  French law accommodated this obligation by
extending to such actors rights similar to copyright, though slightly restricted
in scope.130  Under this system, which is referred to as “related rights,” actors
are not considered traditional authors, but employees.131  The IP Code speci-
fies that performers’ related rights are not to be interpreted in a way that
interferes with the exercise of exclusive rights by authors.132  French law also
addresses the “splintering” effect of which the Garcia court warned,133 by dis-
tinguishing between performing artists and ancillary performers, such as
extras in a film.134  Only performers, defined as “those persons who act, sing,
deliver, declaim, play in or otherwise perform literary or artistic works, vari-
ety, circus or puppet acts” receive intellectual property rights.135
In practice, performers in France receive essentially the same set of
rights as authors,136 though they are conditioned on certain labor law prac-
tices137 and may be trumped by the author’s rights.138  Performers have the
exclusive rights to authorize, via writing, the fixation of their performance,
reproduction of the fixed performance, communication of the fixed per-
127 C. PROP. INTELL. art. L212-3 (Fr.).
128 Teller, supra note 87, at 798.
129 WIPO-Administered Treaties: Contracting Parties, Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Perform-
ances, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp
?lang=en&treaty_id=841 (last visited Arp. 12, 2016).
130 See Marjut Salokannel, Study on Audiovisual Performers’ Contracts and Remuneration
Practices in France and Germany, at 5, Ad Hoc Informal Meeting on the Protection of Audio-
visual Performances, World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], AVP/IM/03/3B (Mar. 31,
2003), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/avp_im_03/avp_im_03_3b.pdf.
131 Id. at 3; see CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] [LABOR CODE] art. L762-1 (Fr.).
132 C. PROP. INTELL. art. L211-1 (Fr.) (“Neighboring rights shall not prejudice authors’
rights.”).
133 See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
134 C. PROP. INTELL. art. L212-1 (Fr.); Salokannel, supra note 130 (“The main principle
of the French law is that every artist performing in a central capacity enjoys protection under the
law.  Artists who perform in ancillary functions from the artistic point of view are excluded
from author’s rights protection.”).  Under this system, if an ancillary actor wants to obtain
IP rights for his performance, he bears the burden of proving that his artistic contributions
meet the standard set forth in the Code. Id.
135 C. PROP. INTELL. art. L212-1.
136 Salokannel, supra note 130 (“In principle, the French law has granted the perform-
ers the whole scope of rights.”).
137 Id. (explaining that performers’ rights are tempered by requirements under collec-
tive labor agreements and employment agreements).
138 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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formance to the public, and separate use of the sounds and images from the
performance where both the sounds and images have been fixed.139
In sum, French performers and authors receive far broader protection
than their American counterparts due to the existence of comprehensive
moral rights and performers’ related rights provisions in French intellectual
property law.  Though the intricacies of the French system are beyond the
scope of this Note, this overview illustrates the significant gap between Ameri-
can and European law.140  America has traditionally opposed intellectual
property law rooted in moral rights,141 and as such, would not likely be
receptive to remodeling its laws after the French IP Code.  However, it could
perhaps learn from France’s related rights scheme—and particularly its dis-
tinction between performers and ancillary actors—and implement a similar
distinction as a means of mediating the impact of performers’ rights on the
film industry.
B. United Kingdom Copyright Law
Copyrights were first recognized in the United Kingdom in the 1710
Statute of Anne, which gave authors a renewable fourteen-year exclusive
right to print works.142  The goal of the statute was to encourage authors to
produce new works, while maintaining a balance between the economic
interests of authors, monopolistic tradition of publishers, and the public
interest.143  As United States copyright law came from England, this history
helps explain the economic focus woven throughout American copyright.144
The U.K. adopted Article 6bis—the moral rights provision—of the
Berne Convention145 in 1928,146 though it did not enact positive legislation
139 Salokannel, supra note 130.
140 See id. at 3–25 for a detailed description of French law on audiovisual
performances.
141 See, e.g., Bird & Ponte, supra note 14, at 247.
142 The Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
143 See, e.g., Bird & Ponte, supra note 14, at 234 (explaining that printers and booksell-
ers thrived under the Statute of Anne, which was not concerned with protecting the
author’s rights or the integrity of their works); Susan P. Liemer, How We Lost Our Moral
Rights and the Door Closed on Non-Economic Values in Copyright, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 1, 9–32 (2005) (providing the background of early copyright in England to
explain the rejection of moral rights and centralization of economic concerns in modern
American copyright law).
144 See, e.g., Bird, supra note 18, at 417 (stating that the utilitarian roots of U.K. copy-
right explain why the U.S. also emphasizes economic interests); Gerald Dworkin, The Moral
Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Common Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
229, 230 (1995) (discussing how moral rights did not play a role in the formation of copy-
right laws in the common law countries).
145 The Berne Convention will be explained in Section II.C below.
146 Dworkin, supra note 144, at 231–32 (explaining the background of the adoption of
Article 6bis).
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addressing moral rights until 1988.147  One committee was gathered in 1952
to examine whether the U.K.’s copyright laws were consistent with Berne,148
and it decided that because contract could cover most problems similar to
moral rights, no one had complained that the U.K. was in breach of Berne,
and the vague nature of moral rights would make legislating on the matter
very difficult, the U.K. should not modify its intellectual property laws to
explicitly provide moral rights.149  As such, the Copyright Act of 1956 did not
address moral rights.150  However, moral rights continued to grow across the
international plane following the addition of Article 6bis to Berne, prompt-
ing the U.K. to reconsider its intellectual property laws.151  A second commit-
tee, the Whitford Committee, was convened to review the moral rights issue
in 1977,152 and this time concluded that the U.K. did need to amend its laws
to comply with Berne.153  Though enacted reluctantly,154 the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA), which still governs U.K. copyright law,
recognized moral rights independent of traditional proprietary rights.155
While its moral rights protection is not nearly as vast as the French IP
Code, the CDPA recognizes two moral rights—the right of attribution and
right of integrity—that subsist for the same duration as the author’s eco-
nomic rights.156  The CDPA places several restrictions on these rights, thus
arguably limiting their effectiveness.157  For example, the right of attribution
does not apply in situations “where it is not reasonably practical to identify”
147 Id. at 232 (explaining that the U.K., and other common law countries, did not enact
new law following the addition of moral rights to Berne because their existing laws were
thought to indirectly cover moral rights).
148 Patricia M. Leopold, Reports of Committees, 40 MOD. L. REV. 685, 685 (1977).
149 Dworkin, supra note 144, at 238.
150 Though the Copyright Act of 1956 did not explicitly provide moral rights, Section
43 of the Act conferred a misattribution right, under which artists could “prevent both
false attributions of a work and false representations that a work was an adaption of
another’s creation.”  Bird & Ponte, supra note 14, at 237 (citing Sheila J. McCartney, Moral
Rights Under the United Kingdom’s Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988, 15 COLUM.-VLA J.
L. ARTS 205, 215 (1991)).  This essentially creates the moral right of attribution, but it was
not referred to as such until the 1988 Act. Id.
151 Id. at 238.
152 See, e.g., id. at 238 (explaining that the government “expressed uncertainty as to
whether contemporary U.K. law . . . fully satisfied the obligations of the Berne Convention
and questioned whether moral rights were actually protected in the United Kingdom” (cit-
ing Leopold, supra note 148, at 685; McCartney, supra note 150, at 219).
153 See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 144, at 238 (describing the recommendations of the
Whitford Committee and its conclusion that English law did not sufficiently address moral
rights); Leopold, supra note 148, at 685–90 (same).
154 Numerous authors have noted that legislators in the U.K. were not excited about
the addition of moral rights to copyright law. See, e.g., Bird & Ponte, supra note 14, at
239–40.
155 Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988, c.48, §§ 77–89 (Eng.).
156 Id. § 86(1).
157 See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 144, at 257 (asserting that the moral rights provisions
were “erode[d] significantly” by waiver policies and restrictions on use).
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the actor.158  With the right of integrity, there is no infringement where mod-
ifications are made as part of the normal editorial process, or where a news
broadcaster makes modifications to remove “anything which offends against
good taste or decency or which is likely to encourage or incite crime or lead
to disorder or to be offensive to public feeling.”159
In contrast with France, moral rights in the U.K. are waivable.160  The
inclusion of this provision caused significant debate during the drafting of
the legislation, as many said that it emasculated the moral rights legisla-
tion.161  Indeed, most authors would end up waiving their moral rights
through contract, thus defeating the purpose of the reforms.162  As one com-
mentator has said, “The commercial reality is that there is very little in rela-
tion to moral rights which cannot be excluded, varied or limited by
contractual provisions.”163  Further, English courts have interpreted the
moral rights provisions of the CDPA narrowly, which further limits the
impact of the CDPA’s moral rights sections.164
Though the reach of the CDPA’s moral rights provisions is limited, the
inclusion of moral rights in copyright law manifests the United Kingdom’s
awareness of the broad moral rights protection granted in other nations, as
well as its efforts to increase, albeit minimally, the protection its own authors
receive.165  The practice of contracting around moral rights may prevent
them from having any real teeth, but unsophisticated or informal parties who
operate without contact are able to claim them still.166
The CDPA was drafted so as to incorporate the Rome Convention, and
thus sets the foundation for protecting certain performers.167  Under the
CDPA, moral rights are only extended to performers for live performances
and those performances embodied in sound recordings, not performances in
158 The Performances (Moral Rights, etc.) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/18, art. 6 (Eng.).
159 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act § 81(6)(c).
160 Id. § 87(2) (stating that the document executing the waiver of moral rights must be
in writing and signed by the performer).
161 See Dworkin, supra note 144, at 256 (noting that the many qualifications and excep-
tions to the U.K.’s moral rights provisions “were attempts by the United Kingdom’s govern-
ment to modify, some would say emasculate, moral rights in the light of business
realit[ies]”).
162 See id. at 257 (stating that the CDPA’s broad waiver provisions “drive a coach and
horses through . . . the moral rights provisions”).
163 Id.
164 For a detailed analysis of English courts’ treatment of moral rights, see Bird &
Ponte, supra note 14, at 240–46.
165 See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 144, at 258 (arguing that the CDPA was successful in
raising awareness of moral rights matters, in that “[e]ven where authors discover that those
with whom they are dealing are seeking to limit or exclude their rights by waiver, that in
itself can serve as a valuable reminder in the negotiating process”).
166 Id. (citing W.R. Cornish, Moral Rights Under the 1988 Act, 12 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
449, 452 (1989)).
167 Liu, supra note 101, at 82.
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audiovisual recordings.168  However, the U.K. has signed the Beijing Treaty
(explained in the following Section) and will therefore need to modify its
exclusion of performances in audiovisual works from moral rights protec-
tion.169  Further, the CDPA does not include a definition of “performer,” so
adopting the definition of the Beijing Treaty—which expressly states that a
performer includes “those who perform a literary or artistic work that is cre-
ated or first fixed in the course of a performance”170—is feasible.  Since the
CDPA already recognizes moral rights, as well, modifying its laws to comply
with the Beijing Treaty should not be difficult, and will provide performers in
the U.K. with protections that they do not have in the United States.  Addi-
tionally, the U.K. has manifested a related rights approach similar to France,
whereby performers are not protected to quite the extent of authors.171
Though the United States has tried to avoid recognizing moral rights,172
the success with which the U.K., the birthplace of the common law system,
has implemented them into its intellectual property law undermines the
United States’ assertion that natural law theories are incongruent with com-
mon law systems.173  As demonstrated by the U.K.’s approach—recognizing
limited rights for actors—including moral rights would not destroy the film
industry as such rights would still predominately be dealt with through con-
tract.  Still, adopting a similar rights regime would bring the U.S. into har-
mony with foreign nations and enable it to flourish as a generator of creative
content.174
168 The Performances (Moral Rights, etc.) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/18, art. 6 (Eng.);
see Liu, supra note 101, at 90 (discussing performers’ rights under the CDPA).
169 See Liu, supra note 101, for a full explanation as to how the U.K. might modify its
laws to better reflect the Beijing Treaty provisions.
170 World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Agreed Statements Concerning the Beijing Treaty
on Audiovisual Performances, WIPO Lex. No. TRT/BEIJING/002 (June 24, 2012), http://
www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=13105 [hereinafter Agreed Statements]; Liu, supra
note 101, at 82.
171 See, e.g., Victor, supra note 5, at 85 n.34 (“British copyright law provides a term of
life of the author plus seventy years for creative works, but when it comes to recordings and
performances, provides only a flat term of fifty years from the date of the recording or
performance.” (citing Paul Edward Geller, International Copyright: The Introduction 1, §§ 3,
4[1](c)(ii), in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (Lionel Bently ed., 2015); F.
Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures Under U.S.
Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 225, 305 (2001))).
172 See, e.g., Bird & Ponte, supra note 14, at 248–50 (explaining the United States’ his-
torical aversion to moral rights).
173 Id. at 267.
174 See, e.g., id. at 282 (advocating for the U.S. to “recognize that the further adoption
of moral rights for creative works . . . offers an opportunity for the country to once again
become a dominant player in the formulation of international intellectual property
rights”).
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C. International Agreements
As highlighted by the preceding explanations of French and U.K. copy-
right law, American copyright law offers inadequate protection to authors of
creative works, especially performers.175  Beyond the author-friendly stance
evident in France’s and the U.K.’s domestic copyright laws, international
agreements comprehensively advocate for broader protection than America’s
domestic legislation reflects.176  Interestingly, the U.S. is actually a signatory
to several of these agreements—most notably the Beijing Treaty and Berne
Convention—indicating its awareness of the rights conferred to authors
abroad.  Whether the U.S. has adequately conformed its domestic law to
encompass these international obligations is doubtful.177  Though a full anal-
ysis of that argument is beyond the scope of this Note, an explanation of the
minimum requirements mandated by these two treaties will demonstrate the
attitude of the international community toward authors’ rights and further
emphasize the United States’ position as an outlier.178
The Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances was adopted in 2012
and focuses specifically on intellectual property rights for performers in
audiovisual productions, such as motion pictures.179  The United States
became a signatory on June 26, 2012.180  Though the Treaty has not yet
come into force, it explicitly confronts claims like Garcia’s and is therefore
relevant to evaluating the viability of acting performance copyrights in the
future.  The Treaty was prompted by, among other things, “the need to intro-
duce new international rules in order to provide adequate solutions to the
questions raised by economic, social, cultural and technological develop-
ments” and concern for “the profound impact of the development and con-
175 Id. at 276 (asserting that the United States’ refusal to evolve with international stan-
dards of copyright law “leaves the United States behind and makes the absence of signifi-
cant moral rights protection glaring”).
176 Id. at 282.
177 See id. at 216 (noting that the U.S. has not completely fulfilled its obligations under
international copyright treaties).
178 See, e.g., Aaron D. White, Note, The Copyright Tree: Using German Moral Rights as the
Roots for Enhanced Authorship Protection in the United States, 9 LOY. L. & TECH. ANN. 30, 31
(2010) (“[T]he United States is lagging behind the rest of the world in providing strong
moral rights protection for authors and is arguably not complying with its international
obligations.” (citing Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post VARA, 1 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 2 (1997); David Nimmer, The Moral Imperative Against Academic
Plagiarism (Without a Moral Right Against Reverse Passing Off), 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 20
(2004))).
179 See, e.g., Liu, supra note 101, at 81 (describing the background of the Beijing Treaty
as a remedy to the defects in its predecessors, the Rome Convention and WIPO Perform-
ances and Phonograms Treaty).
180 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 129.
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vergence of information and communication technologies on the
production and use of audiovisual performances.”181
The Beijing Treaty secures to performers a plethora of proprietary
rights,182 which overlap significantly with rights granted to authors under the
United States’ domestic Copyright Act,183 and also grants certain moral
rights.184  The Treaty specifically addresses gaps left by the Rome Convention
and extends to all performers, which it defines as “actors, singers, musicians,
dancers, and other persons who act, sing, deliver, declaim, play in, interpret,
or otherwise perform literary or artistic works or expressions of folklore.”185
Further, the Treaty recognizes a right of attribution and right of integrity
with respect to an actor’s “live performances or performances fixed in audio-
visual fixations.”186  Notably, these are the same two moral rights that have
been adopted by the U.K.187  The Treaty defines the right of attribution as
the right “to claim to be identified as the performer of [one’s] performances,
except where omission is dictated by the manner of the use of the perform-
ance.”188  The right of integrity is the right “to object to any distortion, muti-
lation or other modification of his performances that would be prejudicial to
his reputation, taking due account of the nature of audiovisual fixations.”189
This caveat in the definition of the integrity right was included to make clear
that modifications “made to a performance during normal exploitation, such
as editing, compression, dubbing or formatting, in existing or new media or
formats, in the course of a use authorised by the performer do not consti-
tute” moral rights violations.190  Additionally, parties to the Treaty agreed
that an objective standard will be used in evaluating whether a use is prejudi-
cial to the performer’s reputation, thus eliminating the performer’s ability to
quash legitimate and reasonable modifications.191  This addresses concerns
that such rights would curb free expression and intellectual progress.192
Though the Treaty is not yet in force, its popularity indicates that claims
in acting performances are viewed by many nations as proper recipients of
181 World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances,
preamble, June 24, 2012, WIPO Lex. No. TRT/BEIJING/001, http://www.wipo.int/wipo
lex/en/details.jsp?id=12213 [hereinafter Beijing Treaty].
182 Id. arts. 6–11 (granting performers the following exclusive rights: right to authorize
the broadcast of their unfixed performances, right to authorize the fixation of perform-
ances, right of reproduction, right of distribution, right of rental, right to authorize the
making available of fixed performances, right of broadcasting and communication to the
public).
183 See e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (also granting exclusive rights of reproduction, dis-
tribution, and public display).
184 Beijing Treaty, supra note 181, art. 5.
185 Id. art. 2(a) (citing Agreed Statements, supra note 170).
186 Id. art. 5(1).
187 See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text.
188 Beijing Treaty, supra note 181, art. 5(1)(i).
189 Id. art. 5(1)(ii).
190 Liu, supra note 101, at 87 (citing Agreed Statements, supra note 170).
191 Id.
192 Id. at 88.
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copyright protection.  Interestingly, the U.S. signed this treaty prior to Gar-
cia, though the Copyright Office does not acknowledge this in its correspon-
dence with Garcia.193  As noted earlier, the Office instead asserted that it has
never recognized an individual copyright in an actor’s performance and does
not intend to do so moving forward.194  The United States has been criticized
for joining international agreements without actually integrating them into
domestic law.195  The position of the Copyright Office, as manifested in its
correspondence with Garcia, indicates that this trend may continue in rela-
tion to the Beijing Treaty.
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
is a treaty administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) that governs international copyright law.196  Relevant for purposes
of this Note, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom are all State
Parties, though the United States did not join the Convention (first estab-
lished in 1886) until 1988.197  Under Berne, each member state is obliged to
recognize the concept of author centrality, as under Article 2, paragraph 6,
which states international copyright protection is to “operate for the benefit
of the author and his successors in title.”198
Berne was first altered to provide moral rights protection in 1928199
through Article 6bis.200  Its provisions have expanded since then.201  The
United States’ opposition to moral rights is one of the primary reasons it was
so late in joining the Convention.202  Commentators have noted several
potential reasons for this stance.  First, in its early history, the United States
was not a large exporter of intellectual property and therefore did not have
193 See Copyright Office Letter, supra note 73.
194 See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
195 See, e.g., Bird & Ponte, supra note 14, at 251 (noting the United States’ practice of
joining international agreements to reap their economic benefits without significantly
impacting domestic law).
196 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, opened for signa-
ture Sept. 9, 1886, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27 (1986), 1161 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Berne
Convention].
197 WIPO-Administered Treaties: Contracting Parties, Berne Convention, United States of
America, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/remarks.jsp?
cnty_id=1045C (last visited Feb. 20, 2016).
198 Berne Convention, supra note 196, art. 2(6).
199 Bird, supra note 18, at 413.
200 Berne Convention, supra note 196, art. 6bis(1) (“Independently of the author’s eco-
nomic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right
to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modifi-
cation of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudi-
cial to his honor or reputation.”).
201 For example, in 1967, Article 6bis was expanded to protect certain moral rights after
the author’s death.  Bird & Ponte, supra note 14, at 238 (citing McCartney, supra note 150,
at 219).
202 Id. at 248 (citing Antezana, supra note 14, at 420; Holland, supra note 19, at 228,
230).
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the need to join the Berne Convention.203  Second, commentators have sug-
gested that the United States’ aversion to moral rights came from a concern
that adopting such provisions “would negatively impact economic interests”
and cause a “chilling effect on investment in creative works” that would
“decrease investment in the arts and entertainment industries, leading to
fewer creative works in the public forum.”204  Recognizing moral rights
would equip authors with an “aesthetic veto” with which they would be able
to control usage of their works; the result would hamper free expression.205
Others still suggest that United States copyright law is generated in reality by
lobbyists from the media and entertainment industries, eager to maximize
their economic benefits at the expense of disadvantaged authors.206
Regardless of its reasons for rejecting moral rights, as a Berne party, the
United States is obligated to recognize them to a certain extent.  Berne was
adopted into American domestic law through the Berne Convention Imple-
mentation Act (BCIA).207  Despite the broad moral rights expressed in
Berne, “[t]he BCIA explicitly waived off the rights of attribution and integrity
and prevented artists from bringing legal actions in the U.S. to defend their
moral rights under the provisions of the Convention.”208  Indeed, Congress
proclaimed that it would take a “minimalist approach” to Berne compli-
ance,209 stating that existing federal and state law already provided authors
with rights equivalent to the moral rights recognized in the Convention and
it therefore did not need to enact new legislation—“a rather disingenuous
claim considering the United States’s rejection of the Convention for over a
203 Id.; see also Bird, supra note 18, at 418 (describing the U.S.’s early cultural identity as
focused on “industry and commercialism” rather than art (citing Rikki Sapolich, Note,
When Less Isn’t More: Illustrating the Appeal of a Moral Rights Model of Copyright Through a Study
of Minimalist Art, 47 IDEA 453, 455–56 (2007))).
204 Bird & Ponte, supra note 14, at 248 (citing Carl H. Settlemyer III, Between Thought
and Possession: Artists’ “Moral Rights” and Public Access to Creative Works, 81 GEO. L.J. 2291,
2309–10 (1993)); see generally David Lange, Symposium Remarks, From Berne to Beijing: A
Critical Perspective, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 1 (2013) (expressing concern that expan-
sion of IP rights threatens fundamental American values, including First Amendment
protections).
205 Bird & Ponte, supra note 14, at 249 (citing Settlemyer, supra note 204, at 2309–10).
206 See, e.g., id. (citing Sherman, supra note 14, at 398, 400–01).
207 Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
208 Bird & Ponte, supra note 14, at 251 (citing §§ 3(b)(1)–(2)); see also id. (suggesting
that the U.S. joined Berne to benefit economically from international agreement “while
sidestepping its obligations to defend moral rights” (citing Antezana, supra note 14, at
426–27, Holland, supra note 19, at 231; Settlemyer, supra note 204, at 2306; Sherman,
supra note 14, at 405–06)).  The BCIA specifically, does not “expand or reduce any right of
an author of a work” to “claim authorship of the work” or “to object to any distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the work,
that would prejudice the author’s honor or reputation.” Id. at 251 n.299 (quoting
§§ 3(b)(1)–(2)).
209 H.R. REP. NO. 100-609 (1988).
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century could be traced back precisely to the need to change U.S. laws.”210
In response to Congress’s inaction, several states enacted their own moral
rights legislation, mirroring some of the rights granted to authors in
Europe.211  However, these statutes lacked nationwide uniformity, and their
effects were thwarted by jurisdictional limitations, thus providing no remedy
with respect to inter-state and online issues.212  Further, many of the statutes
were preempted when Congress passed the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA)
in 1990, which gave authors of a limited category of artworks certain moral
rights.213  VARA has been criticized as Congress’s empty attempt to feign
compliance with Berne, due to its limited scope and restrictive approach to
moral rights.214
In sum, despite the United States’ participation in these prominent
international copyright agreements, Congress has taken hardly any action to
expand the rights of authors.  As such, the United States is in conflict with
many of its European counterparts, leaving American authors vulnerable as
the globalization of intellectual property charges forward.215  As demon-
strated, the United States has taken a firm stance opposing moral rights.
Despite obligations to the contrary under the Berne Convention, the United
States has shown little intention of softening its position.  These inconsisten-
cies in rights recognized could create problems for American authors, con-
sidering the globalization of many industries that deal heavily with
intellectual property—such as technology, music, and film industries.  As the
next Part will illustrate, however, adapting domestic law to provide rights for
performers is feasible under the current Copyright Act, and would better
align the United States with its foreign counterparts, for the benefits of its
authors and its consuming public.
III. COPYRIGHT LAW IN AMERICA
A. Basic Requirements for Eligibility
Congress is charged with the creation of intellectual property laws in the
United States Constitution, which states that the fundamental purpose of the
copyright system is to “promote the Progress.”216  The 1976 Copyright Act,217
which currently governs copyright law in the United States, grants a limited
210 Bird & Ponte, supra note 14, at 252; see also Bird, supra note 18, at 418–20 (describ-
ing Congress’s refusal to legislate for moral rights following its adoption of Berne).
211 See, e.g., Bird & Ponte, supra note 14, at 254.  For a complete list of these statutes,
see id. at 254 n.310.
212 Id. at 255–56.
213 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012) (conferring moral rights of integrity and attribution onto
authors of works of visual art).
214 See, e.g., Rebecca Stuart, Note, A Work of Heart: A Proposal for a Revision of the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990 to Bring the United States Closer to International Standards, 47 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 645, 647 (2007) (criticizing VARA as ineffective and insufficient in light of
international moral rights laws).
215 See, e.g., Bird & Ponte, supra note 14, at 282.
216 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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statutory monopoly to authors as a means of incentivizing artistic production
and dissemination in furtherance of the objectives of the Constitution.218
Eligibility for copyright is understood to be a low threshold,219 as evi-
dent by the language of the act, which sets only four requirements—three
positive and one negative—to receive copyright protection: “Copyright pro-
tection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium
of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device.”220  Further, “[i]n no case does copyright protec-
tion for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, pro-
cess, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.”221  Therefore, copyright protection automatically is
granted to an author where there is originality, a work of authorship, and
fixation in a tangible medium of expression, and the matter is not a system,
method, or idea.222  The Act sets a slightly higher bar for compilations223
and derivative works224 seeking protection.  For such works, the Act requires
that a secondary user—the user utilizing the preexisting material in her new
work—make some contribution to the preexisting work.225  Further, the pre-
existing material must have been lawfully obtained.226
To satisfy the originality requirement, a work needs to be the indepen-
dent creation of the author and contain a “minimal degree of creativity.”227
217 Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 101).
218 See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“[The
limited grant of copyright protection] is intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to
the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”);
Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“The [Intel-
lectual Property] Clause authorizes the granting of a temporary monopoly over created
works, in order to motivate authors and inventors while assuring the public free access at
the end of the monopoly.” (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 429)).
219 See, e.g., Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2000) (describ-
ing the threshold for copyright protection as minimal).
220 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (emphasis added).
221 Id. § 102(b).
222 See id. § 201(a) (stating that copyright vests in the author(s) of the work).
223 “A ‘compilation’ is a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.” Id. § 101.
224 “A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” Id.
225 Id. § 103(b).
226 Id. § 103(a).
227 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (citing NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 89, §§ 2.01[A]–[B]).
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As the Supreme Court has articulated, “the requisite level of creativity is
extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.  The vast majority of works
make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter
how crude, humble or obvious’ it might be.”228  Courts are not to consider
artistic merit when analyzing originality, as their role is not to weigh in on the
value of an artist’s creations, but merely to determine whether the author has
made creations at all.229
To receive protection, a work must also be a work of authorship.230
Despite the extensive set of definitions provided in Section 101 of the Act,
“authorship” is not defined.  The absence of this definition indicates Con-
gress’s intent to leave the term flexible.231  The Supreme Court has deemed
an author, “he to whom anything owes its origin.”232 Authorship had been
defined in several different ways by the different circuits.  Most pertinent to
the Garcia case, the Ninth Circuit has held that to be an author, one must
superintend or be the “master mind” of the work.233  Using similar terminol-
ogy, other courts also assert that an author must have some element of con-
trol over the work.234
Though “work” is not defined, the Act lists appropriate subject matter of
copyright in Section 102, though this list is illustrative, not limiting.235  Rele-
vant to this Note, the 102 subject matter section includes dramatic works,
pantomimes, and choreographic works, in addition to motion pictures, dem-
onstrating that Congress contemplated that each of these could exist distinct
from one other and yield individual copyrights.236
A work also must be fixed “by or under the authority of the author” in
order to be eligible for protection.237  The definitions section of the Act
explains that a work is fixed when it “is sufficiently permanent or stable to
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a
228 Id. (quoting NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 89).
229 See supra note 68 and accompanying text (addressing the Bleistein standard).
230 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
231 See, e.g., Kawabata, supra note 40, at 4 (explaining that the purpose of this flexible
language is “to avoid exhausting the constitutional power of Congress to legislate in this
field” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976))).
232 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
233 Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1232–36 (9th Cir. 2000).
234 See, e.g., Lindsay v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, No. 97 Civ.
9248(HB), 1999 WL 816163, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1999) (holding that a film producer
was the author of documentary footage because even though he did not physically shoot
the copyrighted scenes, he had control over the project’s operation and the final product
duplicated his visions).
235 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Works of authorship include the following categories.” (empha-
sis added)).
236 Id. §§ 102(a)(3)–(4), (6).
237 Id. § 101.
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period of more than transitory duration.”238  Courts have concluded that
fixed for copyright purposes does not mean permanent.239
B. Performance-based Categories of Works Recognized by the Act
As mentioned, the Copyright Act provides a list of eight categories of
works eligible for copyright protection to serve as a guideline.240  Though
“acting performance” is not included, the presence of several performance-
related categories in the list implies that the works rooted in performance are
not excluded per se.  Most analogous to an actor’s performance are panto-
mime and choreographic works,241 which, like an actor’s performance,
derive their expressive merit from their performance.242  Directions of a set
of steps of dance or expressive movements for a pantomime are of far less
value than the performance of those steps as The Nutcracker, for example, as
demonstrated by the lack of a public market for the blueprints of these
works.  Similarly, acting performances, if described in text, would likely be
quite boring, confusing, and of little use to the public, yet the same perform-
ances might be captivating when viewed on screen.  In an early case, the Sec-
ond Circuit equated elements of an acting performance to pantomime,
stating “a play may lapse into pantomime at its most poignant and significant
moments; a nod, a movement of the hand, a pause, may tell the audience
more than words could tell.”243
The fact that pantomime and choreography, which are often encom-
passed within dramatic works and motion pictures, are explicitly granted
their own protection as distinct works shows that the language of the Act
itself is receptive to the protection of physical expression—of course, that
also is fixed—distinct from any underlying instructions, scripts, or screen-
plays.  Given the close analogy between acting performances and pantomime
and choreographic works, if recognized as a valid recipient of protection,
acting performances could be subjected to a heightened originality require-
238 Id.
239 See, e.g., Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Arctic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 873–74 (3d Cir. 1982)
(finding audiovisual effects in computer game sufficiently fixed because although images
were constantly changing, they were sufficiently repetitive and predictable).
240 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1)–(8).
241 Neither pantomime nor choreography is defined in the Act. See id. § 101.  The U.S.
Copyright Office Compendium, however, defines pantomime as “[t]he art of imitating,
presenting, or acting out situations, characters, or events through the use of physical ges-
tures and bodily movements,” and choreography as “the composition and arrangement of
a related series of dance movements and patterns organized into a coherent whole.” U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, glossary, at 3, 13 (3d
ed. 2014), http://copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf.
242 See, e.g., Dougherty, supra note 171, at 303 (“[A]cting involves movement, posture,
and gesture, which are analogous to copyrightable pantomime or choreography.”).
243 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1936); see also
Tiffany Prods., Inc. v. Dewing, 50 F.2d 911, 914 (D. Md. 1931) (“Action can tell a story,
display all the most vivid relations between men, and depict every kind of human emotion,
without the aid of a word.”).
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ment.244  Though pantomime and choreography are not frequently litigated,
the legislative history of these categories indicates that the originality require-
ment for these works is higher than the minimal standard mandated by
Feist.245  This should quiet some concerns regarding the impact of recogniz-
ing rights in acting performances, as the originality requirement would
ensure that “extras” and ancillary actors could not exploit the system.  The
originality requirement would function like the French distinction between
primary and ancillary performers,246 ensuring that only substantive contribu-
tors could reach the threshold for protection.
Additionally, a limited copyright interest for acting performances could
be modeled after the existing sound recording copyright.  Sound recordings
are defined in the Copyright Act as “works that result from the fixation of a
series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the
nature of the material objects . . . in which they are embodied.”247  Sound
recordings receive protection distinct from musical compositions, and a cop-
yright in a sound recording does not extend to the underlying song itself.248
Accordingly, when, for example, a song is fixed on a cassette tape, two copy-
rights exist: one in the musical composition and one in the sound recording.
The sound recording copyright is not infringed by indistinguishable imita-
tions of that recording; only use or reproduction of the literal fixation itself
will infringe.  In a way, the sound recording is somewhat like a derivative
work of the musical composition, in that it utilizes the copyrighted musical
composition, but creates a new, separately copyrightable work in the record-
ing.  Owners of sound recording copyrights do not receive the full set of
exclusive rights provided for most works under Section 106,249 but instead
receive a more limited set of rights.250  Further, these rights are subject to a
number of limitations, such as an exception for public radio broadcasts.251
The definition of sound recordings in the Act explicitly removes sounds
accompanying audiovisual works from protection, so acting performances
cannot receive protection under this provision as it currently exists.  How-
ever, in crafting a remedy to the problem of acting performance rights, the
sound recording copyright could serve as a useful model.  It also serves as
evidence that the United States is capable of accommodating quasi-copyright
244 See Kawabata, supra note 40, at 15–16 (explaining the originality requirements for
pantomime and choreography).
245 See id. at 16 (noting that earlier Copyright Acts required that choreography be “suf-
ficiently ‘dramatic’” and pantomime include a “‘significant amount’ of copyrightable mat-
ter” in order to be protectable (citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM II:
COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, § 461 (1984); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
89, § 2.07[B]).
246 See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
247 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
248 Id. § 114.
249 Id. § 106.
250 See id. § 114(b) (sound recordings not given general public performance right).
251 See id. § 114(d).
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interests like those granted to performers in foreign countries, and establish-
ing a similar right for American performers would not be infeasible under
existing copyright law.
C. Eligibility for Acting Performances
As reasoned by Judge Kozinski during the Garcia litigation, an actor’s
performance, like Garcia’s, would be categorized as a derivative work under
the Act.252  The performance derives from the film’s script, and must be
largely based on that script—which includes the creation of the individual
character’s personality and limits his reactions and relations to other charac-
ters—in order to be a successful performance.  Because they are derivative
works, acting performances could be subject to a more rigorous scrutiny
when determining eligibility for copyright.253  In addition to requiring fixa-
tion, originality, and an original work of authorship, the Act also requires
that derivative works not be based on unlawfully taken material,254 and some
courts require that they contain more than a trivial contribution to receive
protection distinct from the underlying work.255  As such, acting perform-
ances, as derivative works, would have to make more than a trivial variation to
the underlying screenplay or film to be considered for eligibility.
Many actors undeniably input their own creativity into their perform-
ances to satisfy the low standard of “minimal spark” to satisfy the originality
requirement.  Otherwise, as Judge Kozinski stated in his original Garcia opin-
ion, anyone who can read would be an actor.256  However, copyright law
imposes several additional limitations on works, especially pertinent in the
acting context, which could serve as additional hurdles to obtaining protec-
tion.  First, ideas are not protectable, even if those ideas are original to the
author (as in, the author thought of them on his own).257  Basic actions and
emotions that actors might utilize—such as crying, or raising one’s voice—
are merely ideas and thus incapable of ever gaining protection.258  Second,
252 Garcia Amended Opinion, 766 F.3d 929, 935 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d
733 (9th Cir. 2015).
253 See, e.g., Entm’t Research Grp., Inc. v. Genesis Creative Grp., Inc., 122 F.3d 1211,
1219–20 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that originality analysis for derivative works requires a
two-part test to ensure that protection is not given to the underlying works, only the subse-
quent contributions).
254 17 U.S.C. § 103(a).
255 See L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976) (explaining that
authors must add more than a trivial contribution to receive protection). But see Schrock
v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 521 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that “nothing in the
Copyright Act suggests that derivative works are subject to a more exacting originality
requirement than other works of authorship”).
256 Garcia Amended Opinion, 766 F.3d at 934.
257 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea . . . .”).
258 See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122–23 (2d Cir. 1930)
(qualities of anger, anxiousness, love, despondency, and disgust assigned to characters in
plaintiff’s screenplay are ideas and not copyrightable).
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common scenes utilized frequently in expressive works, called “scènes à faire,”
are unprotectable.259  The scènes à faire doctrine bars protection for elements
of a work that are pre-ordained by the topic, such as the inclusion of a stock
character,260 as well as common phrases or events that audiences expect
from a given theme or subject.261
These limiting doctrines could create problems for actors in satisfying
the originality requirement.  Assuming that the actor did not contribute to
the underlying screenplay, the quantity of material in which he could assert a
copyright interest could be severely limited.262  Of course, a combination of
unprotectable elements could rise to the level of protectable interest,263 an
actor who does not have a significant role in the work, and additionally relied
upon a director’s instruction (and thus cannot claim to be the originator of
the content), may simply not have enough elements to combine in order to
establish that interest.
In addition to these problems establishing the requisite level of original-
ity for derivative work protection, actors may find difficulty satisfying the
authorship requirement.  As stated above, courts agree that an author must
have some control over the work.264  Not every individual who makes valua-
ble contributions to a work may claim authorship.265  Many actors, particu-
larly those with minor roles, will have difficulty demonstrating that they had
sufficient control over their performance to satisfy the authorship standard.
The presence of a director or acting coach would make establishing author-
ship even harder.  Furthermore, the actor’s creative choices are strictly lim-
259 See, e.g., Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 824 (9th Cir. 2002) (compar-
ing children’s books for infringement and stating that the “general premise of a child,
invited by a moon-type character, who takes a journey through the night sky and returns
safely to bed to fall asleep” is a basic plot idea and is not copyrightable); Kawabata, supra
note 40, at 8 (“Scènes-à-faire poses a particularly acute threat to short performances . . . since
time constraints impose limitations on the amount of ‘originality’ an actor can exhibit in
his or her performance over and above what is necessary to depict an emotion or deliver a
line.”).
260 See, e.g., Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659–60 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that
stock characters such as a “drunken old bum” are unprotectable scènes à faire (citing
Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986))); Nichols, 45 F.2d at 122
(finding characters of “low comedy Jew and Irishman” in Plaintiff’s play are dramatic pro-
totypes that were not original to the Plaintiff and thus not protectable).
261 See, e.g., Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 824 (noting that setting of a starry sky in children’s
books “naturally and necessarily flows from the basic plot premise of a child’s journey
through the night sky” and constitutes unprotectable scènes à faire).
262 See Kawabata, supra note 40, at 8 (noting that performances would usually be deriva-
tive of films).
263 See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344–51 (1991)
(explaining that combinations of unprotectable facts can become protectable compila-
tions, but the compiler only has a copyright claim in the selection and arrangement of the
unprotectable elements, not the underlying elements themselves).
264 See supra notes 230–34 and accompanying text.
265 Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that “author-
ship is not the same thing as making a valuable and copyrightable contribution” to a work).
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ited to actions that would be true to his or her character in the film, which
most likely was dictated by a third party’s screenplay, not the actor’s own
creativity.  Because of these restrictions, many actors would likely fall short of
authorship and thus not be able to claim an independent copyright in their
performances, even if they were to satisfy the other statutory requirements.
This would be fatal to the actor’s claim of rights, as U.S. copyright law does
not distinguish between authors, who receive full rights, and performers, who
receive limited related rights, as other jurisdictions do.
In sum, United States copyright law as it currently stands is capable of
recognizing actors’ rights in the same limited manner in which it recognizes
copyright in pantomimes and choreographic works.  As Judge Kozinski
asserted in Garcia, so long as an actor is able to satisfy the originality, fixation,
and authorship requirements, he should be able to claim a copyright interest
in his performance.266  In contrast to the Garcia majority’s concern that rec-
ognizing such rights will lead to “copyright of thousands,”267 there are suffi-
cient limiting doctrines already in place that would prevent these fears from
materializing.  Performances would be restricted by scènes à faire and merger
doctrines, and would be subject to the higher originality requirement of
derivative works, thus ensuring that every individual who simply contributed
to a motion picture could not obtain a copyright simply by the nature of his
or her job.
CONCLUSION
Amending the United States Copyright Act to explicitly provide for
actors’ rights, granting all authors moral rights, and imposing broad waiver
provisions such as those in the U.K. would improve the standing of American
actors and filmmakers in the international arena, as it would enhance pre-
dictability and reliability, thus reducing transaction costs of producing films,
and increasing uniformity with international players.  As advances in technol-
ogy continue to saturate the film industry, it is increasingly important that
the United States modernize its legislation in a way that will ensure the con-
stitutional objective of promoting progress comes to fruition.  As the law cur-
rently exists, actors do not have an intellectual property remedy for the
unauthorized exploitation of their performances.  The breadth of this gap in
the law is evident from Garcia.  Even though, based on the limiting doctrines
of copyright, it is unlikely that Garcia ultimately would prevail in establishing
copyright infringement for the reproduction of her performance in Innocence
of Muslims, the ease with which audiovisual performances can be replicated
and distorted suggests that claims similar to Garcia’s will arise in the future.
In order to incentivize performers to disseminate their expressive creations
to the public, American copyright law needs to ensure that they will be ade-
quately protected when those creations are misused.  Reforming the Copy-
266 Garcia Amended Opinion, 766 F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d
733 (9th Cir. 2015).
267 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 743 (9th Cir. 2015).
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right Act to recognize limited rights for actors and general moral rights for
authors will best protect the interests of actors, authors, filmmakers, and the
viewing public.
